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This article reviews the current state of the law in relation to the use of voice
identification parades to test the evidence of a witness who purports to recognise
a witness by voice alone. Such procedures exist but are not used consistently by
police forces, with some forces having decided as a matter of policy not to use
them. Although such procedures are challenging and are more difficult than video
identification procedures, the failure to conduct such a parade is a matter which
should be properly taken into account in assessing the admissibility of a witness’s
evidence.
Introduction
The fallibility of voice recognition has been acknowledged since Biblical times.1
Despite this, the evidence of a witness who purports to recognise a defendant
through knowledge of his or her voice can, of itself, be decisive of guilt or
innocence in a criminal trial. The Court of Appeal, being mindful of such risks,
has directed that such cases be approached with caution, requiring trial judges to
scrutinise evidence and direct juries carefully. There remains, however, a lack of
clarity about the extent of the obligation on the investigating authorities to conduct
a voice identification procedure to support (or undermine) a prosecution where a
witness claims either to be able to recognise the voice they have heard, or where
in the circumstances of the case, they may be able to do so. This uncertainty is
due, in part, to the relatively recent progress that has been made in developing a
voice identification procedure (voice parade), which is forensically robust, coupled
with the comparatively small number of cases in which the issue arises. The Court
of Appeal have approached the question of voice parades with caution: not
interfering with their use when presented by the Crown2 but, in Gummerson,
stopping short of imposing a duty upon the police to conduct them.3 This is an
approach which differs from that which has developed in cases of disputed eye
* I wish to thank Dr DominicWatt from the University of York for bringing this issue to my attention, Andy Ramsay
from the Leicestershire Police for the time he has spent discussing the practical application of voice parades for the
police and my colleague Helen Edwards for her comments on my original drafts.
1 In Genesis 27, Jacob is able to deceive his blind father Isaac, into believing he is talking to his other son, Esau.
2Hersey [1998] Crim. L.R. 281 CA.
3Gummerson [1999] Crim. L.R. 680 CA.
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witness identification, where a failure to conduct an identification procedure is
usually regarded as a breach of Code of Practice D to the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act 19844 (PACE).5 In 2003, the Macfarlane guidelines for best practice
in voice parades were approved by the HomeOffice and circulated to police forces
and prosecuting authorities with an indication that it was hoped that they would
ultimately be incorporated within Code of Practice D to the PACE.6 Subsequent
iterations of the Code of Practice have incorporated references to voice parades
but have not expressly provided for a procedure under which they should be
performed. As a result, as this paper will demonstrate, police forces in England
andWales approach the question of whether or not to conduct a voice identification
in different ways; some forces deploying them on occasion and others making a
policy decision not to do so. This is unsatisfactory: there needs to be a consistent
approach and this article’s approach addresses how the trial process should deal
with this.
Identification evidence
The inherent problem of identification evidence was crystallised by Lord Devlin
in hisReport to the Secretary of State for the HomeDepartment of the Departmental
Committee of Evidence of Identification in Criminal Cases:
“There is no story to be dissected, just a simple assertion to be accepted or
rejected. If the witness thinks he has a good memory for faces, when in fact
he has a poor one, there is no way of detecting the failing.”7
Eye witness evidence is however notoriously unreliable, and the knowledge that
a mistaken witness may confidently identify and thus convict, an innocent person
has served to shape the approach of the criminal justice system in this area. The
case of Turnbull8 has, for more than 40 years, directed the courts in the approach
they must follow in cases of contested eye witness identification. Turnbull requires
judges to remove cases from the consideration of a jury where the witness’s view
is “fleeting or otherwise unsatisfactory.” This recognises that, in certain
circumstances, the quality of an identification may be such that the prosecution
cannot prove that the risk of mistake may be excluded. In withdrawing a case from
a jury, seldom, if ever, is the trial judge making a finding that the witness is wrong;
simply that inherent in the circumstances of the identification are factors which
are apt to introduce the possibility of mistake.
Within the wider class of identification cases are those cases where the witness
purports to recognise the defendant by voice rather than by sight. I shall refer to
these witnesses hereafter as “ear witnesses”. There may be a number of reasons
for this; the witness may have observed an individual wearing a mask,9 the witness
may be identifying a voice they have heard on a telephone10 or the witness may
4Home Office Circular 057/2003, Guidance on the use of voice identification parades.
5Forbes [2001] 1 A.C. 473; [2001] 1 Cr. App. R. 31 (p.430).
6Home Office Circular 057/2003, Advice on the use of voice identification procedures.
7Rt Hon Lord Devlin, Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department of the Departmental Committee
of Evidence of Identification in Criminal Cases (HMSO, 1976), para.1.24.
8 Turnbull [1977] Q.B. 224; (1976) 63 Cr. App. R. 132.
9As in Devlin unreported 14 March 1997 CA.
10As in Karsten v Wood Green Crown Court [2014] EWHC 2900 (Admin).
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simply not have seen the face of their assailant.11 Although the number of cases
which turn on pure voice identification are much rarer than those which turn on
visual identification, the consequences for the defendant convicted on such evidence
remain the same and the fact that such evidence presents a much greater risk of
mistake serves as no mitigation against a sentence following a conviction.
Considerable research has been conducted by those working within the field of
speech science who have sought to identify those factors which have a bearing on
the ability (or otherwise) of a listener to accurately identify a voice where the
witness has no other clues to the speaker’s identity.12 Many of these factors accord
with that which might be anticipated (familiarity with speaker,13 duration of
contested speech, period of time between hearing the known speaker and the unseen
voice),14 but some perhaps run contrary to expectation. To give an example of one
such, apparently counter intuitive, principle there is some evidence that a covering
to the mouth may distort the sound quality of the voice, but there is no correlation
between the thickness of the material of the covering and the extent of the
distortion.15 Of particular significance in the context of many trials, is the lack of
correlation between witness confidence and accuracy, with a witness who asserts
confidence in the accuracy of his or her identification being no more likely to be
accurate than a witnesses who is less certain (notwithstanding the more persuasive
effect that the former may have on a jury).16 To compound the complexity in
assessing the evidence of an ear witness, is the difficulty that a lay person faces
in being able to provide a description of voice in a manner which provides an
accurate set of criteria to scrutinise. Whereas an eye witness could be expected to
be able to list a number of physical features against which the accuracy of a
subsequent identification could be measured, an ear witness may often only be
expected to identify gender, pitch and accent.17 An ear witness may provide a
description of a voice which appears to match that of a suspect, not because he or
she has accurately identified the suspect, but because of the paucity of points which
demonstrate inconsistency. The first description given by a witness of a suspect
is often of paramount importance to a defence advocate in seeking to challenge
the veracity of that evidence through later inconsistency, and without such
inconsistencies, will be hampered in his or her ability to properly test the evidence
(a fact recognised in the recording and disclosure obligations mandated in PACE
Code of Practice D, 3:1).
The challenges of lay voice recognition have been recognised by the Court of
Appeal which has, in a series of authorities, reminded judges of the need to adopt
and adapt the Turnbull guidelines according to the facts of the case. The most
11As in Robinson [2005] EWCA Crim 1940; [2006] 1 Cr. App. R. 13 (p.221).
12A summary of the research in this area is presented in Bull, and Clifford, “Earwitness Testimony” in
Heaton-Armstrong, Shepherd and Wolchover (eds), Analysing Witness Testimony (Oxford University Press, 1999).
13H. Hollien, W. Majewski and E.T. Doherty “Perceptual identification of voices under normal, stress and disguise
speaking conditions” (1982) 10 Journal of Phonetics 139.
14 See, for example J. Kerstholt et al. “Earwitnesses: Effects of Speech Duration, Retention Interval and Acoustic
Environment” (2004) 18 Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 327.
15C. Llamas, P. Harrison, D. Donnelly and D.Watt, “Effects of different types of face coverings on speech accoustics
and intelligibility” (2014), http://www.researchgate.net/publication/237289463_EFFECTS_OF_DIFFERENT_TYPES
_OF_FACE_COVERINGS_ON_SPEECH_ACOUSTICS_AND_INTELLIGIBILITY [Accessed 27 October 2016].
16R. Godfrey and S. Clark, “Repeated Eyewitness Identification Procedures:Memory, Decision Making, and
Probative Value” (2010) 34 Law Hum. Behav. 241.
17A.D. Yarmey, “Earwitness Speaker Identification” (1995) 1. Psych. Pub. Pol. And L. 792 and discussed in D.
Ormerod, “Sounds Familiar” [2001] Crim. L.R. 565.
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detailed review of the problems and analysis of the approach to be taken is found
in the case of Flynn18 where it was accepted (per Gage LJ) that:
“The ability of a lay listener correctly to identify voices is subject to a number
of variables. There is at present little research about the effect of variability
but the following factors are relevant:
(i) the quality of the recording of the disputed voice or voices;
(ii) the gap in time between the listener hearing the known voice and
his attempt to recognise the disputed voice;
(iii) the ability of the individual lay listener to identify voices in general.
Research shows that the ability of an individual to identify voices
varies from person to person.
(iv) the nature and duration of the speech which is sought to be identified
is important. Obviously, some voices are more distinctive than others
and the longer the sample of speech the better the prospect of
identification.
(v) the greater the familiarity of the listener with the known voice the
better his or her chance of accurately identifying a disputed voice.
However, research shows that a confident recognition by a lay listener of a
familiar voice may nevertheless be wrong.”
The final paragraph of the judgment stresses the need for a “very careful direction
to the jury, warning it of the danger of mistake in such cases”. Commenting on
Flynn, Roberts noted that:
“It might strike some as rather odd then that, while procedures for procuring
visual identification evidence from witnesses are the subject of an elaborate
regulatory framework, no similar scheme exists in respect of voice
identification evidence.”19
Whether a witness possesses the ability to accurately recognise a voice is a matter
determined by an individual’s cognitive processes in encoding material in their
aural memory and this is something which varies greatly from individual to
individual. Where a defendant disputes an identification it is for the prosecution
to prove that the witness can be relied upon, and to do so it needs to be able to
demonstrate the witness’s ability to identify voices accurately. In eye witness
identification cases such evidence is routinely provided by video identifications
and such corroboration must be desirable in every case where the consequences
are a criminal conviction.
Identification procedures in England and Wales
Flynn and St John does not address the question of whether a voice parade should
be conducted in cases where the accuracy of an ear witness’s identification is
challenged. To answer this question it is necessary to consider the position in law
in relation to visual identification procedures and then the evolution of the voice
parade.
18Flynn [2008] EWCA Crim 970; [2008] 2 Cr. App. R. 20 (p.226).
19A. Roberts, “Case Comment Evidence: Identification Voice Recognition” [2008] Crim. L.R. 799.
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Identification procedures are an established part of the criminal investigation
process. Since 1986 their deployment and operation has been governed by Code
of Practice D, issued by the Secretary of State, pursuant to PACE s.66.20 These
codes have seen a number of revisions over time with the current version coming
into force on 7March 2011.21 The 2011 version of Code D states that identification
procedures are
“designed to:
• test the witness’ ability to identify the suspect as the person they saw
on a previous occasion.
• provide safeguards against mistaken identification.”22
The detail that follows in the Code of Practice provides regulation on when and
how identification procedures should take place, providing safeguards designed
ensure the integrity of the evidence which may result from them. Where there has
been a breach of the Code of Practice, it is for a judge to assess whether the
evidence obtained in consequence of that breach should be excluded pursuant to
s.78 of PACE based upon the overall fairness of the proceedings. Where it has
been established that there has been a breach of one of the Codes of Practice which
relates to identification, the trial judge should first decide whether the evidence
should be excluded and, if it is not, the jury should be directed to consider the fact
that there has been a breach, how that breach arose and whether that breach would
cause them to have doubts about the safety of the identification.23 Failure to give
such a direction may, of itself, render a conviction unsafe.24
There was for some time, dispute as to the extent to which officers were
compelled to conduct an identification procedure. The position was settled by The
House of Lords in Forbes (insofar as eye witnesses are concerned) in relation to
the Code of Practice D as it existed from 1995 which, at para.2.3, stated:
“Whenever a suspect disputes an identification, an identification parade shall
be held if the suspect consents unless paragraphs 2.4 or 2.7 or 2.10 apply. A
parade may also be held if the officer in charge of the investigation considers
that it would be useful, and the suspect consents.”
In Forbes it was argued, on behalf of the Crown, that where a defendant had already
been picked out on the street by a witness who identified him as the perpetrator
of a robbery, there was no breach of Code of Practice D as the procedure would
have served no useful purpose. Lord Bingham, giving the judgment of the court
concluded otherwise, stating that:
“(1) Code D is intended to be an intensely practical document, giving
police officers clear instructions on the approach that they should
follow in specified circumstances. It is not old-fashioned literalism
but sound interpretation to read the Code as meaning what it says.
20 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s.66.
21 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Codes of Practice) (Revision of Codes A, B, and D) Order 2011 (SI
2011/412).
22Code of Practice D para.1.2.
23Forbes [2001] 1 A.C. 473; [2001] 1 Cr. App. R. 31 (p.430) at [27].
24 See for example Gojra [2010] EWCA Crim 1939; [2011] Crim. L.R. 311.
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(2) Paragraph 2.3 was revised in 1995 to provide that an identification
parade shall be held (if the suspect consents, and unless the
exceptions apply)whenever a suspect disputes an identification. This
imposes a mandatory obligation on the police. There is no warrant
for reading additional conditions into this simple text.
…
(4) We cannot accept that the mandatory obligation to hold an
identification parade under paragraph 2.3 does not apply if there has
previously been a ‘fully satisfactory’ or ‘actual and complete’ or
‘unequivocal’ identification of the suspect by the relevant witness.
Such an approach in our opinion subverts the clear intention of the
code. First, it replaces an apparently hard-edgedmandatory obligation
by an obviously difficult judgmental decision. Such decisions are
bound to lead to challenges in the courts and resulting appeals.
Second, it entrusts that decision to a police officer whose primary
concern will (perfectly properly) be to promote the investigation and
prosecution of crime rather than to protect the interests of the suspect
… Third, this approach overlooks the important fact that grave
miscarriages of justice have in the past resulted from identifications
which were ‘fully satisfactory’, ‘actual and complete’ and
‘unequivocal’ but proved to be wholly wrong. It is against such
identifications, as well as against uncertain and equivocal
identifications, that paragraph 2.3 is intended to offer protection to
the suspect.”
The court accepted that there may be circumstances where conducting a procedure
would be futile, but anticipated that these cases would exceptional. The judgment
in Forbes led to a revision in the language of subsequent editions of the Code of
Practice to give a clearer voice to the mandatory obligations.25
Forbes was confined to identity parade for eye witnesses and there has been
very little by way of subsequent consideration of whether the police are compelled
to conduct procedures in other types of cases. Assistance on this point can be found
by examining the development of best practice in this field, alongside the historical
redrafting of the Code of Practice to establish whether the approach in Forbes can
be used to infer a mandatory obligation to conduct voice parades.
The development of voice parades
A recognition of the value in having a procedure by which voice identifications
can be tested can be traced back to the Devlin report of 1976 which (noting the
practice adopted in Sweden) observed that:
“There is at present no adequate procedure at all for testing the capacity to
recognise the voice, and so far as we can ascertain there has been no scientific
research into this question. Questions of voice identification arise rarely, but
there is no saying when one will, and we recommend that research should
25This can be most clearly seen by the replacement of the word shall with the word “must” into the equivalent
paragraph to that analysed in Forbes [2001] 1 A.C. 473; [2001] 1 Cr. App. R. 31 (p.430) at [3.12].
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proceed as rapidly as possible into the practicability of voice identification
parades, with the use of tape recorders or any other appropriate method, which
among other things would have to take account of the dangers of disguising
the voice and the extent of changes induced by stress.”
The issue was not properly grasped in the initial formulations of Code D, which
made no acknowledgment of the need for a voice parade divorced from a visual
procedure but instead conflated the two. In Annex A to the 1986 Code of Practice,
para.17 read that:
“If a witness wishes to hear any parade member speak … the identification
officer shall first ask whether he can identify anyone on the basis of appearance
only. When the request is to hear members of the parade, the witness shall
be reminded that the participants in the parade have been selected on the basis
of physical appearance only. Members of the parade may then be asked to
comply with the witness’s request to hear them speak.”
This formulation survived the 1991 and 1995 revisions of the Code. Whilst the
prohibition on the investigator raising the issue might seem to operate as a
safeguard, this provision created a real risk of false identifications. The visual
similarity of a suspect may create a preconception in the mind of the witness to
such an extent that when they hear the voice they will make a positive identification
due to lack of dissimilarity, rather than actual identification. The inherent danger
of this approach is amply demonstrated by the Scottish case of Patrick Meehan
where such a process (albeit tainted by witness contamination) formed part of a
prosecution case which resulted in the wrongful conviction of an innocent man.26
Three Court of Appeal judgments are of particular relevance in the history of
voice parades. The first of these is Deenik, where part of the Crown’s case came
from a police officer who had spoken to an individual called “Robert Lloyd” about
a drugs importation on the telephone. The defendant was subsequently arrested
and the officer, on overhearing him speak to the custody sergeant, identified him
as the man she had spoken to.27 The argument was advanced that the (1986 version)
of Code D covered voice identifications and that the absence of a parade was a
factor to be taken into account in considering whether to exclude the evidence. In
refusing a renewed application for leave to appeal the court (McCullough J) stated
that provisions of Code D were of “little, if any, assistance” in cases of voice
recognition.
Attempts were made by some police forces to try and introduce voice parades
on an ad hoc basis and a conviction was obtained with the support of one such
method in the case of Hersey. Hersey concerned the armed robbery of a shop in
Portsmouth by masked men. The shop-keeper alleged that he recognised the voice
of one of the men as being a regular customer. A tape was compiled, consisting
of a 10 second clip extracted from a previous police interview with the defendant
and 11 recordings of volunteers uttering the same phrase. The shop-keeper identified
the defendant’s voice as being that of the robber. An application to exclude the
evidence of the parade was refused by the judge and the defendant was convicted.
In dismissing his appeal the Court of Appeal (Swinton-Thomas LJ) stated they
26Ludovic Kennedy, Thirty-six murders and two immoral earnings, 2nd edn (Profile Books, 2003), p.118.
27Deenik [1992] Crim. L.R. 578.
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could see no “valid reasons why … the judge should not have admitted the
evidence” and that “[i]t is often overlooked that identification parades may be as
valuable to an accused as they are to the prosecution.” In commenting on Hersey,
Ormerod cautioned that:
“All those involved in criminal trials would surely welcome a procedure for
establishing the accuracy of a voice identification, but it is vital that the correct
one is implemented.”28
A subsequent attempt to extend Hersey to create an obligation on investigating
authorities to conduct voice parades was rejected in the 1999 case ofGummerson.
In this case, (where a drug dealer was beaten by four masked men, the voices of
three of whom he claimed to recognise) no such procedure was held. The defence
argued that para.2.3 of the 1995 edition of Code D created an obligation to conduct
such a parade and cited the approval of the process inHersey. The Court of Appeal
(per Clarke LJ) were unimpressed with this argument, observing that Hersey had
not touched upon Code D and commenting that the “Code D has no application
here. It relates only to visual identification. We do not think that the draftsman of
the Code had voice identification in mind”.
This appears to represent the last attempt to invite the Court of Appeal to give
guidance on these types of procedures. The position was reviewed by Ormerod in
2001 who identified those factors which needed to be addressed with care in
conducting a voice identification parade including the choice of foils, the number
of speakers, whether the parade was live or recorded, the duration of the sample
and choice of words to be spoken. He concluded that:
“It is, therefore, incumbent on English law to formulate appropriate safeguards
and procedures to ensure that an efficient and reliable system is established
for pre-trial and trial uses of voice identification evidence.
It has been demonstrated that this could be achieved with relative ease. A
major element in ensuring an adequate procedure lies in the police and
advocates having a sufficient understanding of the strengths and weaknesses
of the evidence.”29
The absence of clear, evidence-based guidelines was rectified shortly after this
article. In 2001, DS John MacFarlane of the Metropolitan Police investigated the
death by arson of a woman in a flat.30 One of the witnesses against the accused
was his tenant who claimed to have overheard the defendant commissioning the
fire. This conversation was denied by the defendant. DSMacFarlane worked with
Francis Nolan, Professor of Phonetics at the University of Cambridge, to produce
a series of guidelines which (through a combination of adoption of the procedural
safeguards embodied in PACE and best practice in linguistic analysis) eliminated
any risk that the suspect might be given undue prominence in the parade. The
process requires the oversight of a suitably qualified expert who ensures that the
voices used as foils were appropriate both in terms of content and quality (the foils
being collated from excerpts of previous interviews) and encourages the use of
28Hersey [1998] Crim. L.R. 281 CA.
29Ormerod, “Sounds Familiar” [2001] Crim. L.R. 565.
30 F. Nolan, “A recent voice parade” (2007) 10(2) International Journal of Speech Language and the Law 277.
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“dummy runs” of the parade on volunteers unconnected with the case, to ensure
the recording is not possessed of qualities which subconsciously draw the witness’s
attention to the suspect. Clear warnings were given to investigating officers not
to conduct a parade with live stooges and to ensure that the evidence was only
treated as corroborative rather than determinative. In the case in question, the
witness successfully identified the defendant as being the person he had overheard
planning the crime. The Crown sought to call Professor Nolan at trial to give
evidence as to how the parade was conducted and the results of it and, despite
opposition from the defence, were permitted to do so. Following the failure of a
submission of no case to answer, the defendant changed his account, accepting
that it was his voice that the witness had heard but disputing the context of the
words spoken. He was subsequently convicted. With the benefit of this admission
there can be confidence both that the witness was accurate and the parade
demonstrated this; what is unclear is whether, without such admission, a jury would
have been persuaded of that fact.
In reviewing the case, Nolan noted that there was scope for improvement in the
future through the assessment of perceptual similarity of the voices used in the
parade and greater use of a phonetic expert to extract the initial description. In
conclusion he commented that:
“[C]ommissioning a voice parade should not be undertaken lightly. The
well-known constraints of voice memory already place a serious limit on the
weight which can be attached to a positive identification, and, as those who
have prepared a voice parade will be aware, it is very difficult to achieve a
voice parade whose fairness cannot be called into question for one reason or
another. The cost-benefit ratio is likely to be favourable only in rather few
cases.”
Notwithstanding these concerns, the Home Office approved the approach and on
5 December 2003 produced a circular, based upon the guidelines, which was
distributed to criminal investigation and prosecuting agencies. The preamble to
the circular includes the following observations:
“1. Further consideration has been given to the scope for developing
voice identification procedures for use by police forces in England
&Wales. Currently, Code D, paragraph 1.2, of the Codes of Practice
under PACE allows for such procedures to be used, but does not
specify which procedures must be followed.
2. This work to develop reliable procedures for voice identification,
which may ultimately go forward for inclusion in Code D of the
PACE Codes of Practice is on-going in consultation with relevant
stakeholders. However, as there will continue to be cases from time
to time where the police may wish to use such procedures, this
Circular seeks to offer advice to forces through an example of good
practice.
…
4. The Home Secretary has agreed that slightly amended procedures
can be promulgated to forces, as an example of good practice, which
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have been tried and tested in the Courts and can be safely applied in
similar, relevant circumstances.
5. The purpose of this Circular therefore, is to offer forces an example
of good practice for advice and guidance. The procedures set out
here are not mandatory, but it is recommended they be followed
closely, as appropriate in the circumstances, where a voice
identification parade is to be held by the force.”31
In 2005, Code of Practice D was amended. The reference to asking participants
in identification parades to speak was removed (in part, as a result of the traditional
physical identity parade having largely been superseded by video identification
procedures). The code now contained the following paragraph:
“While this Code concentrates on visual identification procedures, it does not
preclude the police making use of aural identification procedures such as a
“voice identification parade”, where they judge that appropriate.”
This wording remains at para.1.2 of the most recent (2011) edition of the Code.
Use of voice parades by police forces
There has, since 2003 been guidance on how to conduct voice identification parades
and since 2005, approval of their use as part of the criminal investigation process.
But to what extent are they used and do police forces approach them consistently?
In order to examine this, every police force in England and Wales was asked, via
a Freedom of Information request, how many voice identification parades they
had conducted in accordance with the Macfarlane guidelines between 2005 and
2015.32
Of the 43 forces asked, only four indicated that they had used the procedure.33
A further four indicated that they had considered using parades in specific cases
but it was ultimately deemed not to be appropriate or necessary or that they would
consider using them if the circumstances arose.34 Themajority of forces (21) simply
indicated that they either had conducted no voice identifications or held no data
to suggest that they had been conducted. Of these 21 forces, one35 does have on
its public website, an identification procedures policy which provides detailed
guidance on voice identification procedures including the guidance:
“A voice identification procedure must be conducted in accordance with the
spirit of Code D of PACE. This may be done by an expert comparing the
voice of an offender taped during the commission of an offence (e.g. an
extortion demand) with, for example, a taped interview by adapting the
confrontation procedure. Consideration could also be given to a person who
31Home Office Circular 057/2003, Advice on the use of voice procedures.
32Via a request made on 18 November 2015.
33Greater Manchester (1), Metropolitan (4), Merseyside (“more than 0, fewer than 3”), Leicestershire (2 + 1 outside
the time frame enquired about).
34Cambridgeshire, Derbyshire, Surrey and West Mercia.
35Thames Valley.
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knows the suspect’s voice very well (e.g. a family member, close friend)
listening to the offenders voice on audio tape.”36
Another five forces indicated that they did not store data on either voice or video
identifications in a retrievable format. Perhaps the most significant finding was
that seven police forces responded indicating that, as a matter of force policy, they
did not undertake voice parades.37 Only one of these police forces expanded upon
the reason for this, citing a lack of equipment.38 One of the forces expressed it in
terms of being a “service” that they “do not provide”.39 The remaining five forces40
responded with words to the effect of “we do not undertake this process”. In the
absence of additional evidence, no conclusions can be drawn as to whether or not
those 26 forces who either had no information, or no information in a retrievable
format had not conducted parades due to similar policy decisions or simply because
no necessity has arisen; similarly in those police force areas where a policy decision
has been made not to conduct voice parades, there is no evidence that cases have
arisen where it would have been appropriate to do so. However even in those police
forces which had conducted such procedures, the decision to request such a
procedure is made by an individual officer in the case or CPS reviewing lawyer,
and there is no way of ascertaining that such decisions are made consistently at
an individual level.
It is however apparent that there is an inconsistency between police forces in
respect of the use of parades which potentially bears upon the trial process.
A duty to hold a parade?
So what duty is there (if any) upon the police to conduct voice parades? If the case
against an accused turns wholly or largely on aural recognition the outcome of a
voice identification parade will, almost always, be of benefit to the case of one the
parties. If it is positive it will allow to the Crown to demonstrate the ability of their
witness to recognise the defendant’s voice in controlled conditions: if it
unsuccessful it will corroborate a defendant’s assertion of innocence. Only the
police have the necessary resources to conduct such parades and, with time being
a crucial factor in ensuring the integrity of any process, the investigating authorities
will be uniquely placed to retain this evidence at the earliest opportunity and if
parades are not carried out timeously their evidential value will be depleted.
There is a compelling argument that since 2005, Code D has, through the
inclusion of a reference to voice parades, required police officers to be proactive
in their use. Prior to the amendment of the Code of Practice in 2005, there was no
dispute as to the potential admissibility of such procedures, nor to the fact that
care needed to be taken in conducting them (indeed the Code takes matters no
further forward in this latter respect). Had the 2005 version of the Code of Practice
D remained silent on the point, the position would have remained as per Hersey
and Gummerson, their use being permitted where appropriate but with them
36Thames Valley Police, Identification Procedures, http://www.thamesvalley.police.uk/identification_procedures
_update_01_07_14.pdf [Accessed 27 October 2016].
37Two forces refused to answer the request.
38Gwent.
39Bedfordshire.
40Humberside, West Midlands, City of London, Gloucestershire and South Yorkshire.
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explicitly sitting outside the ambit of the Codes of Practice. If the design of the
parade had been such as to render the process unfair, s.78 of PACE could still have
operated to prevent the admission of the evidence without reference to a Code but
there was no duty to even consider a parade.
The introduction of voice parades into Code D must therefore be doing more
than simply advising best practice by bringing voice parades under the umbrella
of the “intensely practical” Code D. Lord Bingham’s judgment in Forbes on the
importance of Code D being treated as “meaning what it says” places a powerful
interpretive obligation in favour of an objective review of the case unfettered by
such external factors as force policy. Prior to Forbes the Court of Appeal noted
in Popat41 that:
“[I]t is always necessary to have regard to the purposes of Code D both in
interpreting and applying the Code and assessing situations which are not
expressly covered by it. The overall purpose is one of adopting fair
identification practices and adducing reliable identification evidence. Where
insufficient regard is had to these purposes the discretion to exclude evidence
under s.78 is likely to be exercised and convictions will be liable to be treated
as unsafe.”
Even on the conservative interpretation of Code D in Popat, it was accepted that
an assessment and review needed to be undertaken on the facts of the case to
determine whether there were reasons which rendered an identity parade
unnecessary. In Gummerson, part of the prosecution’s argument was based on the
purposive approach in Popat, but the Court of Appeal never addressed this issue
due to the Court’s outright rejection of the use of Code D at all. If as Gummerson
suggests the absence of reference to voice parades is evidence of intention to
exclude them from the ambit of Code D, their subsequent inclusion must be
evidence that the draftsmen intended that they were embedded within the Code in
both word and spirit. Indeed as the Court of Appeal as observed in Gummerson:
“As we see it, unless and until it is thought appropriate to draft a code for
identification of this kind, the matter can properly be dealt with by the careful
application of suitably adapted Turnbull guidelines.”
That “unless and until” came into being in 2005 when the new Code came into
force. The Court of Appeal in Gummerson did not intend their judgment to cover
future editions of the Code; their entire dismissal of the arguments raised was
based on the existing Code’s silence on the point. This lacuna has now been filled
and the judgment now has little foundation. If one followsGummerson to its logical
conclusion, the diligent legislative draftsman, having made reference to voice
parades would, have explicitly distinguished their application from eye witness
procedures.
It is right to acknowledge that there are much greater practical and resource
implication in conducting voice identifications than there are with video
identifications which mean they are not suited to every case. In order to conduct
the process, identification officers need a recording of suitable quality and duration
(at least 15 seconds worth of speech being required). The speaker must be speaking
41Popat [1998] 2 Cr. App. R. 208; [1998] Crim. L.R. 825.
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“normally” and care must be taken to ensure nothing in the text of the speech can
assist in the identification. In certain circumstances a suitable sample can be
extracted from the tape recorded interview, but where a suspect remains silent or
answers “no comment” or where the questioning in interview is such that the
responses are all obviously connected to the crime under investigation then there
is nothing which can be used to build an identification parade. If a sample has been
obtained, then foil samples need to be obtained from existing police interviews
which are suitably proximate in terms of accent, tone, pitch and recording quality
and whose content is equally subject neutral. This process is both time consuming
and expensive, as the suitability of material needs supervising by a phonetic expert.
Where a suspect in an investigation has an accent or dialect which is local to the
police force conducting the inquiry, this increases the chances that a suitable
number of foils can be located; where the suspects accent or dialect is of a group
which is not as widely represented in the police area, it will provemore challenging.
Some of these challenges could be overcome through pooling of resource and
expertise across forces, but there will remain a number of cases where through no
fault of the police, a fair voice parade cannot be conducted. This is however not
a problem unique to voice parades and the language of the Code reflects this by
softening the mandatory wording with the caveat of “unless it is not practicable
or it would serve no useful purpose in proving or disproving whether the suspect
was involved in committing the offence.” The practicability test is likely to be far
easier to satisfy through objective evidence for voice parades than it is for video
identifications and an investigating officer who has considered the use of the
process and not proceeded with it because it is not possible need not fear criticism
for having breached the Codes.
When para.1.2 of PACE is read as whole, it assumes that a decision to conduct
a parade will be made by an officer exercising judgement as to whether or not it
is appropriate to do so. This is a fact sensitive decision to be made on a case-by-case
basis. Although Lord Bingham in Forbes was concerned about the exercise of
discretion being vested in the hands of the investigating officer whose interests lie
in the prosecution of an offender, there is a difference between a nebulous exercise
of “discretion” in whether or not to conduct a procedure and an evidence based
“judgment” as to whether it is appropriate or not based on an evaluation of the
case.
The language of the Code, when read in conjunction with Forbes, makes its
primary purpose ensuring the safety of identification evidence and directing how
that should be achieved. What is required of the police is not the production of
voice identification parades in every case, many of which may ultimately be of no
evidential value, but an open minded approach to the question of identification
and an understanding of the techniques which many be deployed to ensure that its
accuracy is tested and such an approach cannot exist where a police force has
adopted a blanket exclusion on the use of a procedure—indeed it is difficult to see
how such a policy could be consistent with the need to pay sufficient regard to the
purposes of the Code. The point has yet to be argued in the Court of Appeal but
were an investigating officer to concede in a case that but for a policy decision
they would have conducted or considered conducting, a voice parade, it would be
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perverse to ignore the recognition of their use in the Codes in considering the
weight to be attached to the evidence.
The impact upon trial
How then, should these principles translate into the trial process? The first
consideration is whether cases which turn on the admission of voice identification
should proceed at all, given the high possibility of error. Flynn, whilst not
prohibiting a prosecution proceeding on this basis anticipates that any case
involving the prosecution adducing voice recognition evidence will involve a
review of admissibility to ensure the probative value of the evidence outweighs
its inherently prejudicial effect.42 Undoubtedly there will be situations where the
level of familiarity that the ear witness has with the suspect is high and the
opportunities to hear the disputed speech were good. In these circumstances a case
may be left to the jury but with close judicial scrutiny and modified Turnbull
directions. Where the prosecution cannot establish either of these two criteria and
there is no other evidence the case cannot be safely left to a jury.
The more frequent scenario is the case where the voice identification is part of
a tableau of evidence. Here the introduction of weak voice recognition evidence
may corroborate or be corroborated by other evidence to create case which is
greater than the sum of its parts. In George part of the evidence against the
defendant inmurder case came from awitness who heard a partially unseen gunman
shout “you’re dead now”. He purported to recognise the voice as being the
defendant who he had been at school with briefly some three years before. In
evidence he admitted he thought the voice was George’s although he was not sure.
The defence argued that the jury should be directed to disregard this evidence. The
judge refused but did direct the jury to exercise great caution in considering this
exercise. He directed the jury to treat gunshot residue present on the defendant’s
clothing as being corroborative of the identification. This approach was upheld by
the Court of Appeal in dismissing a renewed application for leave to appeal.43 On
a subsequent referral from the Criminal Cases Review Commission (following
fresh evidence which called into doubt the safety of the residue evidence), the
Court of Appeal, whilst not disagreeing with the approach taken by the trial judge,
accepted that if the residue evidence was not satisfactory, the conviction could not
be safe. In cases such as this, there should be close scrutiny of the quality of the
voice recognition evidence in isolation before admitting it before the jury and a
continuing assessment of both the evidence itself and any evidence which may
corroborate it.44
In any form of assessment of the admissibility of the evidence and subsequent
directions to the jury, the presence or absence of a voice parade should be a factor
to be taken into account.Where a positive identification has been made on a parade
the jury should be entitled to receive evidence of how the parade was conducted
and be directed that the parade may confirm the witness’s ability to identify the
42The Court of Appeal in Robinson [2005] EWCA Crim 1940; [2006] 1 Cr. App. R. 13 (p.221) whilst using the
language of admissibility of “admissibility” in relation to one defendant introducing such evidence against another
is thought to have been doing more than applying a test of legal relevance—is the evidence such that a jury could
rely on it—See Ormerod [2006] Crim L.R. 427.
43Brown [2004] EWCA Crim 1471.
44George [2014] EWCA Crim 2507; [2015] 1 Cr. App. R. 15 (p.183).
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speaker, albeit with the additional warnings which would accompany such a
direction. Positive identification on a voice parade should not however be used to
render admissible ear witness evidence which would not meet the minimum criteria
described in Flynn. Where a voice parade has been conducted and the ear witness
has not identified a speaker that should be a factor which should weigh very heavily
against the admission of that piece of evidence for the Crown, regardless of the
strength of other evidence. In cases where a voice parade has not been carried out,
consideration should be given as to why this is the case. Where it has not been
done because of policy considerations or factors unrelated to the quality of the
evidence that would be produced, these again should be powerful factors to be
taken into account in considering whether the evidence is admissible. Where it
can be demonstrated that a safe voice parade could not have been performed then
less weight should attach to its absence—although the overall consideration should
remain the quality of the identification. In every case where identification is
disputed and no voice parade has taken place, its absence should be a weakness
which the jury are directed to consider in their assessment of the evidence. Where
the failure can be seen to be the result of the police failing to act in the spirit of
Code D this direction may be couched in stronger terms appropriately tailored to
the facts of the case.
In the 20 years since voice parades began to be adopted, whilst Code D has
evolved to be more accommodating to their use little progress has been made in
standardising their use across police forces. If miscarriages of justice are to be
avoided, investigating officers, advocates and legislative draftsmen need to give
serious consideration to the mechanisms by which identification evidence can be
tested and address the consequences of a failure to do so. The robust procedures
which exist to ensure that evidence which may be decisive in a trial is properly
scrutinised deserve to be applied to all evidence of this type, regardless of the
sensory organ under challenge.
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